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 Abstract 
Over a one-year period from January 2015 to January 2016, a team of researchers collected 
nearly 100,000 Tweets from female operated Twitter accounts that exhibited pro-Islamic State 
(IS) affiliations. The following exploratory research paper aims to address two questions: (1) 
will identifiable patterns of engagement be revealed through a thematic analysis of Tweets 
posted by pro-IS women?, and (2) do these patterns illuminate the roles pro-IS women occupy 
online and in real-time social networks? This research paper intends to challenge the gendered 
assumption that women play strictly supportive roles within the boundaries of the IS, and 
demonstrate that IS female supporters fulfill multiple roles in online and real-time social 
networks. This paper will outline the eight roles identified using a thematic content analysis of 
pro-IS women’s Tweets. The main findings reveal that pro-IS women primarily fulfill 
supportive roles, but that they also play a variety of non-traditional roles as well, such as 
recruiters and even terrorists. This knowledge of how women are using Twitter to support the 
IS, and the roles they play online and in real-time social networks, can be used to develop more 
effective counterterrorism strategies to deter the radicalization and recruitment of individuals 
online. 
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Introduction 
“The only regret I have is not making Hijrah to the Islamic State earlier.” 
 - IS Supporter Tweet 
 Tweets like the one above are common among Twitter users who support the Islamic 
State1 (IS). Numerous individuals utilize the social media networking site as a platform to 
spread propaganda and encourage people to make hijrah2 to the IS. One such example is an 
American woman who was given the moniker “ISIS Superstar” after flooding Twitter with 
pro-IS propaganda (Zavadski, 2016). Her comments frequently violated Twitter’s terms and 
conditions for use, and prior to her arrest in February 2016 for threatening two FBI agents, she 
had created nearly 100 different Twitter accounts (ibid). Although the “ISIS Superstar” never 
migrated to Iraq or Syria to join the IS, various other individuals have – several encouraged by 
these types of propagandist messages via Twitter (Huey & Kalyal, 2015).  
Whereas numerous Western males have made passage to Syria and Iraq to become 
foreign fighters, less is known about the reasons why women choose to migrate and the role 
they play once in IS-held territory (Hoyle, Bradford, & Frenett, 2015). A meta-analysis of 
terrorism literature revealed merely fifty-four publications on female terrorism over a twenty-
three-year period between 1983 and 2006 (Conway & McInerney, 2012). Another study notes 
that of the 7,590 articles on contemporary terrorism, the large majority focus on men’s roles in 
                                                
1 The Islamic State (IS) is a group of radical pro-jihadist Sunni Muslims who operate primarily out of Syria and 
Iraq. In 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghadi (the IS leader) self-proclaimed himself as the ‘Caliph Ibrahim’, and declared 
the IS as the worldwide caliphate. By doing so, al-Baghadi believes to have political and religious authority over 
all Muslims (Laub & Masters, 2016; Brajawidagda, Chatfield, & Reddick, 2015). The IS is sometimes referred 
to as the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS), the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant (ISIL), and/or Daesh 
(the Arabic acronym) (Reding, 2016).  
2 Hijrah (Arabic) meaning to migrate, in this context referring to migrating to the IS.  
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terrorist groups, with merely “cursory attention” devoted to women’s roles (Hoard & Makin, 
2014, p. 532).  
This research paper challenges the gendered assumption that women play strictly 
supportive roles within the boundaries of the IS, and demonstrates that IS female supporters 
fulfill multiple roles in online and real-time social networks. To do this, the researchers3 
collected data from ninety-three Twitter accounts belonging to pro-IS females over a one-year 
period. Analysis of this data reveals that IS women do not exclusively fulfill supportive roles, 
but a variety of non-traditional roles as well. I will first review the current literature regarding 
women’s roles in pro-jihadist groups, as well as their roles in online pro-jihadist social 
networks. I will then outline the research methods, data collection, and analysis used, and 
present the research results with an explanation of the eight roles identified providing real 
examples of pro-IS women’s Tweets. The paper will then conclude with a discussion of the 
main research findings and how these findings can be used to develop more effective 
counterterrorism/anti-radicalization strategies.  
Women’s Roles in Jihad 
 Traditionally, popular notions of what it means to be a “woman” have not been 
associated with violence. Rather, femininity and terrorism are treated as antithetical to one 
another and therefore much of the early literature on women’s roles in pro-jihadist groups has 
focused instead on their supportive roles as wives and mothers (Conway & McInerney, 2012; 
Gentry & Sjoberg, 2011; Robison, 2010). The tendency for women to maintain traditional roles 
                                                
3 The researchers for this project included Dr. Laura Huey (Professor of Sociology at Western), Hillary Peladeau 
(Ph.D. Candidate at Western), and myself, a M.A Candidate and member of the Countering Violent Extremism 
Lab at Western University. As a member of this team, I was involved in the data collection and coding process 
and am using the data collected for my M.A research paper.  
3 
 
 
within pro-jihadist groups arises from the patriarchal structure of radical Salafism doctrine. 
The Shari’ah4 outlines the proper familial structure for Islamic members and incorporates a 
patriarchal bias which remains to this day within pro-jihadist groups (Wadud, 2006). Between 
1980 and 2002, a study of the FBI’s data on all terrorism investigations found that 67% of 
women held subordinate roles within their domestic terrorist groups (Hoard & Makin, 2014). 
The passive roles some women hold within these groups are adopted from the traditional roles 
fundamentalist Islamic women are typically expected to hold within the larger society (Gentry 
& Sjoberg, 2011; Ness, 2005; Schneider, 2014; Wadud, 2006).  
Violent jihad is not typically viewed as a female pursuit (Cook, 2005). While male 
martyrdom5 is honoured, female martyrdom is often viewed critically because women are 
perceived as not being “pure enough…to be offered up as suicide bombers in Islam” (Ness, 
2005, p. 359). However, this opinion has weakened since the emergence of Islamic feminism 
which has challenged the traditional understanding of the female jihad. As a consequence of 
these shifting attitudes, growing numbers of women have been engaging in more active roles 
in their pro-jihadist groups (Cook, 2005; Holt, 2010; Lahoud, 2014; Ness, 2008; Von Knop, 
2007). For example, in her analysis of seventy-two women residing in IS-held territory, 
Spencer (2016) concluded that women in IS-held territory are “performing a myriad of 
activities in moral and logistical support, state-building, and tactical operations” as well as 
“roles in leadership, domestic affairs, and acts of violence” (p. 75). 
                                                
4 The Shari’ah (also spelt Sharia) is the legal system of Islam which governs those with Islamic faith.  
5 Martyrdom, in this context, is form of honorific death whereby a person has willfully sacrificed themselves in 
the name of jihad or Islam.  
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Social media has been vital to increasing the visibility and popularity of the IS. The IS 
has been far more successful in online jihad6 than any other jihadist organization, so much so 
that it has been given the label ‘online jihad 3.0’ (Cervone & Peresin, 2015). In 2014, it was 
estimated that anywhere between 46,000 to 70,000 pro-IS affiliated Twitter accounts were 
active; however, the IS’s social media success can be attributed to a smaller number of very 
“hyperactive” users (Berger & Morgan, 2015, p. 3). Some IS media campaigns have shown to 
be more effective than anti-IS counterterrorism media campaigns. For instance, an IS 
recruitment Tweet received 32 favourites7 whereas a counterterrorism Tweet posted at the 
same time received zero positive responses (Sorenson, 2014). 
Cervone and Peresin (2015) contend that social media holds three main functions for 
the IS and its users: identity formation, radicalization, and recruitment. The IS has created very 
effective media campaigns targeting potential sympathizers from the West, promoting 
propaganda, and portraying the IS as a legitimate state – as a sort of “Disneyland for Muslims” 
(Cervone & Peresin, 2015, p. 504). In Hoyle, Bradford, and Frenett’s (2015) study of female 
migrants to IS-held territory, they explained that one of the reasons women choose to make 
hijrah was to contribute to the construction of the IS’s utopic version of an Islamic Caliphate. 
The utopic portrait of the IS is reinforced by propaganda via Twitter and other social media 
sites (Huey & Peladeau, 2016). Online campaigns have shown to be particularly effective at 
recruiting young Western females, but these campaigns have gained high visibility and support 
                                                
6 Online jihad refers to the use of the internet (principally social media networking sites) to communicate, raise 
funds, spread propaganda, or otherwise support violent jihadist groups. 
7 A “favourite” on Twitter signifies that a particular user likes or enjoys the content of the Tweet.  
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from both female and male recruits all over the globe8 (Cervone & Peresin, 2015; Huey & 
Kalyal, 2015).  
There has been increasingly more online support for women’s roles in jihad. Women 
are taking to the Internet to write about their experiences, encourage other women’s 
involvement in the IS, and show solidarity for their “sisters9” (Huey & Peladeau, 2016; 
Lahoud, 2014). In his exploratory analysis of female IS affiliated Twitter users, Varanese 
(2016) found that female Twitter users are more influential than males – females are 
disseminating more propaganda and keeping IS Twitter members more informed than male 
users. As a consequence, pro-IS women have a stronger ability to radicalize individuals via 
Twitter than their less influential male counterparts (Varanese, 2016). Another sign of support 
for women’s role in jihad is online pro-jihadist magazines like al-Khansaa10 which encourage 
women’s activity in jihad (Peladeau, 2016). Although it is not clear if the authors of these 
publications are female, since many are written under a pseudonym, it is evident that attitudes 
towards women’s roles in jihad are changing (Lahoud, 2014). Nevertheless, Cervone and 
Peresin (2015) argue that as of yet, there is little evidence to suggest that the IS is “embracing 
women’s empowerment and their involvement in fighting, even if the women seem attracted 
by such a possibility” (p. 503). Furthermore, in their analysis of women’s participation in 
online pro-jihadist networks, Huey and Peladeau (2016) found that Twitter does not act as a 
platform to encourage or empower women to take on significantly more active roles within 
                                                
8 The “2016 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada” estimates since 2011 (the onset of the Syrian 
Conflict), at least 6,600 people have migrated to Syria from a Western country, and a minimum of 180 Canadians 
(20% of those being female) have made hijrah.  
9 Pro-IS Twitter users frequently refer to their IS compatriots as their “sisters” and “brothers”, but they are not 
typically biologically related.  
10 Al-Khansaa was launched by a branch of the al-Qaeda – the IS has not yet publish a female-centered magazine; 
however, they do have a variety of online magazines such as Inspire and Dabiq.  
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their pro-jihadist groups; however, the use of social media sites like Twitter does provide 
women with an opportunity to engage in online jihad with fewer gender norm constraints. 
Many of these women live in social spaces within which they may not be able to actively 
participate in pro-jihadist groups or the wider community as much as they would like, and the 
anonymity of social media can be used to help emancipate them from these gender-based 
constraints (Von Knop, 2006; Witmer, 2016). Social media also enables women to express 
their pro-IS thoughts and beliefs more freely than in the real world. This may especially be the 
case for individuals outside IS-held territory where pro-IS ideologies are viewed negatively.  
Twitter allows women who may be interested in jihad the opportunity to connect with other IS 
sympathizers and recruiters with anonymity and little to no suspicion from family members, 
or even authorities (Huey & Kalyal, 2015; Huey & Witmer, 2016).  
Our understanding of the roles pro-IS women occupy in these online social networks 
remains incomplete. Few studies have analyzed women’s roles in pro-jihadist groups, and 
those which have typically include a small number of cases or are over a short time frame. For 
instance, Alexander (2016) examined twenty-five American jihadi women and revealed that 
each individual fit into three overlapping categories: ‘plotters’ (those who develop and/or carry 
out attacks), ‘supporters’ (those who distribute propaganda and other information regarding 
their jihadi group), and ‘travelers’ (those who migrate to join the group). Another example is 
a study by Klausen (2015) which explored pro-jihadist social media accounts over a three-
month period and revealed that one of the main roles women have is to disseminate knowledge. 
Klausen (2015) also found that the content women posted was often targeted towards making 
“extremism appear like a normal life-style decision” (p. 17). The aforementioned studies have 
done much to increase our understanding of the female jihad’s role; however, they have been 
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restricted by limited time frames and small sample sizes. The roles women fill within the IS 
community, both online and in real-time social networks, have expanded beyond those which 
have been previously observed, and therefore there is a need for a more in-depth analysis of 
the multifaceted roles women can occupy in pro-IS networks.  
Methodology 
Twitter is the most popular social networking site among pro-jihadist groups, and it is 
especially favoured by the IS and their supporters (Marcu & Balteanu, 2014; Weimann, 2014). 
Twitter is the ideal research ground for this study because the short 140-character limit on posts 
makes the analysis of Tweets easier than the longer posts available with other social media 
sites. Furthermore, Twitter accounts are public unlike other social networking sites11. Through 
an analysis of nearly 100,000 Tweets collected over a one-year period, this paper will address 
the following research questions:  
1. Will identifiable patterns of engagement be revealed through a thematic analysis of 
Tweets posted by pro-IS women? 
2. Do these patterns illuminate the roles pro-IS women occupy online and in real-time 
social networks?  
Data Collection 
The study began in January 2015 with one popular pro-IS Twitter account that had 605 
followers. Using snowball sampling (a non-random research technique) the researchers used 
the initial account to identify other pro-IS accounts to follow. The accounts were only included 
in the sample if they met three criteria: (1) the account holder identified as female, (2) her 
                                                
11 Anyone is able to search, view, and save public Tweets; nevertheless, for ethical reasons, this study has blacked 
out all Twitter usernames included in the Tweet examples to ensure anonymity.  
8 
 
 
account showed signs of an affiliation with the IS, and (3) her posts were primarily in English. 
To determine whether the account holder was female, the researchers looked at biographical 
information, pictures, and avatars present on their Twitter profile; the content of their Tweets; 
and the account holder’s Twitter handle12. For example, many of the female pro-IS Twitter 
account holders operate under a pseudonym beginning with the title “Umm13” meaning 
“mother”. To determine whether the woman was affiliated with the IS, the researchers looked 
at the content of the users’ Tweets, for example, if they Tweeted IS propaganda or other pro-
IS content. We also looked at pictures on the users’ Twitter account – many pro-IS Twitter 
accounts use the IS flag as their profile picture. The researchers looked for other social media 
accounts on sites such as Facebook, Tumblr, ask.fm, and YouTube to gather more information 
about the account holders.  
 In total, ninety-three Twitter accounts were followed, and nearly 100,000 Tweets were 
collected during a one-year period from January 2015 to January 2016. At the conclusion of 
the study, thirty-five accounts were still being actively followed. Given Twitter’s policy for 
not condoning violent content, some of the accounts were suspended over time and were not 
relocated. Other users blocked the researcher’s account, and some accounts were simply 
deleted by the account holder. When accounts disappeared, new accounts were followed in 
their place.  
The profile of each Twitter account added to the list of those being “followed” was 
captured in a PDF using Adobe Acrobat. The account holder’s Tweets were collected every 
                                                
12 The Twitter handle is the name the account holder operates under, in the case of pro-IS Twitter accounts, it is 
often an alias.  
13 While the title “Umm” assumes the female gender, it may also be used by men as an alias to impersonate the 
female gender (Klausen, 2015).  
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day using Twitonomy, a software used to backup and store Tweets. This way, if an account 
suddenly disappeared or was suspended, a record remained of all Twitter activity.  
Data Analysis 
 The researcher applied thematic analysis to analyze and code the Twitter data collected. 
Thematic analysis is a qualitative method used to identify themes within a set of data (Braun 
& Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis was chosen for this study because of its relative flexibility 
which allowed the researcher more freedom to analyze the complex Twitter data in a way that 
made the most sense for the purpose of this study.  
An inductive approach was used in the initial stages of coding to compose a data set 
based on the account holder’s basic demographic factors, such as their estimated location and 
age. The researchers took detailed notes on the Twitter data primarily focusing on posting 
patterns and any identifiable roles women adopt within the IS network, and then began to 
develop an understanding of those roles. Literature regarding women’s roles within pro-
jihadist networks was also used to help guide the thematic analysis and coding.  
Eight roles emerged from common themes that appeared in the content of the Tweets, 
the eight roles are: Fan-Girls, Baqiya Members, Propagandists, Recruiters, The Muhijrat, 
Widows, Terrorists, and Leavers (these roles will be further explained in the research results).  
Summary of Women’s Roles in Pro-IS Networks  
Fan-Girls Active online female supporters of IS and part of pro-IS networks. 
Typically, they are young females (15-25) and view belonging to a 
subversive network as ‘cool’. They tweet a range of content, from family 
and school issues to support for hardcore violence. They produce no 
propaganda content themselves, but retweet material produced by others 
in the network. 
Baqiya 
Members 
They see themselves as members of a community and view their 
participation online as supporting their ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters’ – both 
ideological and emotional bonds. They are not only potential migrants 
and financial supporters of IS, but also function to pass along IS 
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propaganda/messages (retweets). 
Propagandists They are ideologically committed to IS and espouse strong religious 
views. Their posts are largely, if not exclusively, promoting pro-IS 
propaganda; they post little to no personal information or inter-personal 
content. Their goal is to help convert potential recruits to their cause. 
Recruiters These women serve as contact points, providing information, emotional 
and other support to females seeking to migrate to Syria to join IS. They 
have a strong ideological commitment and public espousal of strong 
religious views. 
Muhijrat They serve both practical and ideological functions within IS: they 
represent ‘success’ stories within IS propaganda aimed at recruiting 
women (‘she made hijrah, you can too’). They are the women necessary 
to building the IS (a state requires a population, particularly one 
contributing to its support); they are wives and mothers, as well as 
workers (when required). 
Widows These are women whose husbands have been killed fighting for the 
Islamic State. As widows, they hold a highly regarded status, which they 
take from their husbands who are now “shaheed” or martyred for the 
cause. 
Terrorists Individuals who have been charged with terrorism-related offences. 
Leavers Individuals who leave IS-networks for any reason, whether it be through 
abandonment of pro-jihadist causes or to join another group.  
Note. Reprinted from “‘Support for Sisters Please’: Comparing the Online Roles of Al-Qaeda Women and 
their Islamic State Counterparts” by H. Peladeau, 2016, MA Thesis, Western University, London, ON. 
 
After analyzing the content of a user’s Tweets, the accounts were coded as belonging 
to one or more of these roles. For example, if a woman posted few independently written posts, 
shared personal information, used a lot of emoticons, and posted content that contradicted IS 
dogma, she may be coded as a Fan-Girl (Huey & Witmer, 2016). To illustrate how the data 
was coded, consider the following Tweet: “Oh! Tomorrow I'm going to be a year older 😱 
➡➡➡👵🐱🐱🐱”. This Tweet exhibits personal information and a heavy use of emoticons 
which are characteristics of a Fan-Girl, and if this user’s other Tweets further illustrated themes 
typical of a Fan-Girl, she would be coded as such. 
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The eight roles are not mutually exclusive – the content of a user’s Tweets may exhibit 
characteristics associated with more than one role. For instance, a woman may fit the role of 
both a Baqiya member and a Propagandist. In this circumstance, the Twitter user would be 
coded as both roles. The content of a user’s Tweets may also change over time as her position 
changes in real-time and online social networks. As an example, a Twitter user might be coded 
as a Fan-Girl when we first begin to follow her, but with time she may adopt the role of a 
Muhajirah (a woman who has migrated to the IS), and would be coded accordingly. The 
intention of this study is not to suggest that these eight roles fully encompass the many roles 
women can occupy within IS social networks; rather, the intention is to begin the process of 
better identifying women’s roles within the IS and help expand our knowledge of the ways in 
which gender, social media, and pro-jihadist identity interrelate –  an area of research which 
has been greatly understudied.  
When the final stages of coding were complete, the codes were verified by a number 
of research assistants who work in the Countering Violent Extremism lab at Western 
University. This was done to ensure inter-coder reliability. Each researcher independently 
analyzed the content of a user’s Tweets and coded them according to the themes they thought 
the individuals exhibited.   
Research Results 
The following sections include a breakdown of the study’s sample (Figure I), and 
explains the eight roles that have been identified to further the understanding of pro-IS 
women’s roles online and in real-time social networks. The roles will be explained in order by 
the extent of radicalization – from the least radicalized to the most.   
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Classification of Women’s Roles 
Fan-Girls. A “Fan Girl” is defined as a “girl or woman who is an extremely or overly 
enthusiastic fan of someone or something” (Huey & Witmer, 2016, p. 1; Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary, 2016). In this case, a Fan-Girl is an individual who is overly enthusiastic about the 
IS because she believes it is “cool” to belong to the subversive IS-network. To determine 
whether a Twitter user is a Fan-Girl, the researchers looked for young women who primarily 
retweet what other IS supporters have posted and do not produce their own propaganda content. 
Fan-Girls will often Tweet about their home and school life, and celebrate extreme violence 
(Huey & Witmer, 2016). There are seventeen Fan-Girls in this sample who range in age from 
approximately fifteen to twenty-five years old, and they are the least radicalized group in this 
research study. 
The term Fan-Girl has been adopted by IS social networks to describe women and girls 
who identify with the IS subculture but who are not considered devoted members (Huey & 
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Witmer, 2016). More established members, like the Baqiya, tend to dismiss Fan-Girls and 
consider them “wannabes”. In comparison to the other roles, Fan-Girls are not strongly 
religious and are the least ideologically committed to the IS. Their posts typically do not 
conform to the fundamentalist beliefs they are expected to hold as a member of the IS social 
network, and therefore they are not as strongly radicalized as the other roles in this study. The 
content of a Fan-Girls Tweets often has less to do with IS ideology, and more to do with their 
everyday lives, for example, Fan-Girls may post content that shows disrespect for their elders, 
or posts about boys: 
Giving dawah to those much senior to you is so harddddddd.. their arrogance     
is based on age. - Fan-Girl Tweet 
 
These boys have ruined everything for me. - Fan-Girl Tweet  
 
One of the most defining characteristics of a Fan-Girl is her belief that violent 
extremism is “cool”. They will often speak about violence and IS extremism in a childish 
fashion, and they tend to use a lot more emoticons than other pro-IS Twitter users: 
someone buy me a gun 😭🔫 - Fan Girl Tweet  
 
Someone give me the evidence that burning alive is allowed? :) - Fan Girl  
 Tweet  
 
Huey (2015) asserts that the “cool” factor of online jihad appeals to disaffected youth14. Fan-
Girls believe being part of a violent counter culture makes them “edgy”, but it also provides 
them with a sense of community and belonging.  
While Fan-Girls do generate their own original Tweets, they are more likely to retweet 
the posts of other more established users in the IS social network. Fan-Girls follow these more 
                                                
14 See Huey’s (2015) article “This is Not Your Mother’s Terrorism” for more information about “jihadi cool” and 
the practice of political jamming. 
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established members with deep devotion and respect. They will retweet them, cite them in their 
posts, and give them “shout outs”: 
Shoutout to @CatSeikh, suspended again, but he's back. - Fan Girl “Shout Out” 
 
I'm just a kitten but even kittens know to follow lionesses.  So do it!            
@OumHu55ain  @OumHu55ain @OumHu55ain   - Fan Girl Follow Request  
 
Fan-Girls treat their Twitter accounts being suspended as an achievement. In his 
research of male foreign fighters, Amarasingam (2015) interviewed a member of the Baqiya 
family who said that “one of the prerequisites to be baqiya is to have your Twitter account 
suspended”. Fan-Girls view account suspensions as Twitter “martyrdom”, and believe it 
demonstrates their devotion to the IS and may help their acceptance into the Baqiya family: 
Where the heck is my suspension, I been speaking the haqq &amp; doing   
absolutely everything wrong according to twitter &amp; I'm still here😀  o   
wells - Fan Girl Tweet  
 
Unlike more devoted members in the IS online subculture, Fan-Girls may use a real 
photo of themselves as their Twitter profile picture. More dedicated members, like the Baqiya 
and Recruiters, believe women’s faces should not be viewed in public and disapprove of using 
real photos on Twitter (Huey & Witmer, 2016). Fan-Girls’ use of “selfies”, and their tendency 
to post a lot of personal information reveals their lack of ideological commitment to IS 
doctrine15. 
Baqiya (Baqiyah) Members. When identifying Baqiya members on Twitter, the 
researchers looked for women who: view themselves as a member of the IS online community, 
refer to themselves as belonging to the Baqiya “family”, and demonstrate support and 
encouragement for the Baqiya. Twenty-six of the women in the sample are Baqiya members. 
                                                
15 For more information on Fan-Girls see Huey and Witmer’s (2016) paper “#IS_Fangirl: Exploring a New Role 
for Women in Terrorism”. 
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While most of the individuals are in their twenties, some of the women are in their late forties 
to early fifties, and they reside in areas such as Canada, the U.S, and France. While some 
Baqiya members were raised Muslim, others have converted to the Islamic faith. Baqiya 
members share ideological and emotional bonds with other members whom they address as 
their “brothers” and “sisters”: 
Baqiya familia let's stick together no matter what the kufr try, follow and          
support our brother @abdisamed3 @abdisamed3 - Baqiya Retweet  
 
This online “family” is very important to the female members. They receive love and support 
from their “sisters” and share emotional bonds that they believe will help keep their Baqiya 
family strong and protected against from outside threats. For example, women will offer “shout 
outs” to those members whose accounts have recently been reactivated, and ask for duas16 for 
their “sisters” which shows they are being supported and prayed for. The members are very 
protective over their Baqiya family and they show their solidarity through posts that convey 
their devotion: 
@_LaDy_GhUrAbA_: Try not to suspend Baqiyah Family or else.....:)        
- Baqiya Retweet  
 
Although Baqiya members primarily retweet pro-IS content, some members will also 
post their own material. Typically, the content they produce has to do with religious doctrine 
or supporting their Baqiya “family”. Baqiya members not only serve the function of passing 
on propaganda messages, but they will also financially support the IS. For example, one 
women Tweeted:  
List of groups who support / pledged allegiance to the Islamic State #ISIS   
#ISIL #baqiyya http://t.co/67PhuQpvXd" - Baqiya Tweet  
 
                                                
16 Prayers. 
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Baqiya members are more radicalized than Fan-Girls because they are more dedicated 
to the IS ideology – the content of their Tweets conveys more religious and ideological 
commitment than is demonstrated in Fan-Girl Tweets. Baqiya members are very outspoken 
about their devotion to the Baqiya “family” and the IS, which makes them very susceptible to 
recruiters who may target them as potential migrants.  
 Propagandists. A Propagandist is a female who predominately Tweets pro-IS 
propaganda, religious doctrine, and posts little to no personal information about themselves. 
We have identified four women in our sample who fit the role of a Propagandist. These women 
show evidence of a strong ideological commitment to the IS ideology. They vary in age from 
early twenties to late forties, and are located all over the world, including the U.S, Iraq, and 
Syria. Some of the Propagandists in our sample are also part of the Baqiya family: 
To my baqiah family... @ me if you need shoutout for your new account.     
In sha Allāh will help to spread your account - Propagandist Tweet 
 
This particular Propagandist is extremely popular on Twitter and other social media sites like 
Facebook and Tumblr, and a number of articles have been written about her17. This 
Propagandist uses Twitter to write about her experience of moving to IS-held territory and 
marrying an IS fighter. She disseminates so much propaganda and other pro-IS content that 
Ram (2014) has called her “one of the most active ISIS members on the Internet”.  
The Propagandists identified rarely post personal information about themselves –  this 
is likely to protect themselves from being identified by authorities. For instance, the previously 
                                                
17 See “Married to An ISIS Fighter, A 26-Year-Old 'Muhajirah' Claims To Be A Malaysian Doctor” (Says.com), 
“An ISIS Love Story: “Till Martyrdom do us Part”” (Buzzfeed.com).  
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mentioned Propagandist posted on Facebook that she does not tell “personal details to 
strangers”, and that it is merely speculation that she originated from Malaysia (Ram, 2014).     
The IS Propagandist’s main goal is to convert potential recruits, and they do this by 
disseminating pro-IS propaganda that encourages individuals to make hijrah: 
Good news for all of you. Islamic state is expanding. If you cant fly to Syria     
or Iraw.. then go to Libya! Or Nigeria or Somalia. - Propagandist Tweet  
 
They will also post Tweets espousing their strong religious views, and prayers to Allah: 
May Allah blind the kuffar and shield the mom and her kids from their evil  
and oppression, Ameen - Propagandist Tweet  
 
These women’s Tweets may help to recruit vulnerable individuals by using propaganda 
techniques such as posting content that make jihad look “cool”, posting violent scenes to evoke 
emotional appeals, and conveying the belief that it is a Muslim’s duty to support the IS (Huey 
& Kalyal, 2015).  
Recruiters. A Recruiter is a female who provides emotional, informational, and 
logistical support to women who are interested in, or preparing to migrate to IS-held territory. 
When identifying recruiters on Twitter, our researchers were looking for women who 
predominantly Tweeted recruitment strategies, pro-IS propaganda, and posts about their strong 
religious views. Recruiters are extremely committed to the IS ideology which makes them 
more radicalized than Fan-Girls, Baqiya members, and Propagandists. There are three 
Recruiters in this study’s sample who have been identified by the IS as being among their 
recruiters.  
Recruiters primarily post Tweets that encourage individuals to make hijrah: 
Whoever settles amongst the disbelievers, celebrates their feasts and joins in                
their revelry and dies in their midst will likewise be #NT - Recruiter Tweet  
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These women will also post information and tips on how to successfully make hijrah. For 
instance, one woman posted “DON’T tell anyone about your hijrah” to protect others from 
being found out by reporters or authorities online. Another woman posted these three tips:  
1. Take a Mahram18 with you 2. don't think that the reality on ground is            
what you see on YouTube videos 3. don't marry any Tom Dick or Harry          
- Recruiter Tweet  
 
Recruiters not only post recruitment Tweets, but will also speak with potential migrants 
through Twitter’s direct messaging service. They may offer them support regarding what plane 
to take, where to go once they arrive, who to talk to, who to avoid, and they may even serve as 
a contact point. Recruiters may also direct individuals to helpful resources, for example, an 
unknown author affiliated with the IS produced an e-book titled Hijrah to the Islamic State 
(2015) which outlines how to make hijrah.  
Recruiters also provide migrants with emotional support through their hijrah journey, 
for example, this woman congratulated her “sister” on her migration:  
Wallahi ...My sister has just messaged me she has just got into the Islamic            
State! Alhamdulillah ♥May Allah accept her hijrah aameen! - Recruiter Tweet  
 
Recruiters will post about these “success stories” to further encourage others to follow their 
path. The main role for Recruiters is to persuade people to migrate to the IS, but they will also 
post Tweets enticing individuals to support the IS in their home countries if they are not able 
to migrate: 
Sisters if you cant make Hijrah, you too should go forth in the cause of Allah  
wherever you are. - Recruiter Tweet  
 
Recruiters make it very easy for women to contact them and obtain all the information they 
need to migrate to the IS. Without their help, it is likely that some of the Muhijirat (migrants) 
                                                
18 A male relative.   
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in our sample may not have successfully made hijrah. This makes Recruiters one of the biggest 
security threats to which authorities should pay attention. By noting who follows them on 
Twitter and retweets or favourites their posts, security professionals may be able to flag and 
deter potential migrants.  
 The Muhajirah (pl: Muhijrat). The Muhijrat are women who have publically 
announced on Twitter that they have migrated to IS-held territory. These women have made 
the difficult migration to the IS proving that they are extremely religiously and ideologically 
committed; therefore, the Muhijrat are more radicalized than the aforementioned roles. There 
are twenty-seven women in this role, most of them are in their early twenties, but some are 
older. The roles these women play are very important to the IS because they represent “success 
stories” of women who have made hijrah, and they act as living proof that the IS propaganda 
that aims to recruit these women is effective. The Muhijrat are a main focus of Western fears 
because large numbers of women have, and continue to make attempts to migrate: 
It feels like I never left the West. Im surrounded by so many Brits and     
Europeans its unbelievable. - Muhajirah Tweet  
 
Many of the women post about how many people have already migrated to the IS, and they 
Tweet about how nice it is to meet all these people from different countries who share the same 
ideology. They frequently post religious doctrine and talk about how they can freely and openly 
practice Islam. The Muhijrat Tweet about how pleasant their lives have become since they 
made hijrah, and they question what everyone else’s excuse is for not making the journey: 
The muslim ummah has no excuse to make hijrah now. The khilafa is        
established,  the flag is raised and the shariah put into practise. - Muhajirah        
Tweet  
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These women not only use Twitter as a platform to share their stories of hijrah, but they also 
use it to help recruit other women by advertising assistance to those who are interested in 
migrating to the IS: 
 @Ak47zNeedLove: For help with Hijrah you can come to me or any of                             
my beloved brothers @an_Najdee @qistheword_ @citizenkhil4f4        
@Usamah_M… - Muhajirah Retweet  
 
The Muhijrat contribute to, and help build up the IS community by marrying IS fighters, 
working when needed, and raising the next generation of IS supporters. Some women will post 
Tweets that discuss how they have been married since arriving in the IS – typically these 
marriages are arranged quickly after their arrival since marriage and child bearing are 
necessary for building the legitimacy of the IS. The Muhijrat will also write posts about how 
the IS has the same “luxuries” as their home land. They want to encourage hijrah by showing 
women that the IS has a wide variety of commodities like baby food, vitamins, produce, 
chocolate, and even fast food (see Figure II).  
 
The Muhijrat will also talk about the IS’s facilities, such as how good their health care and 
schools are. One woman posted a prayer for her “sisters” who were writing a medical exam 
Figure II: Muhajirah Photo Tweet 
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that day with the hashtag “#women_under_isis”. They want women to know that their lives in 
the IS are not as they have been depicted by the media and journalists. One woman wrote: 
And never believe what the kuffar write about Doula, saying the women don't         
see the sunlight and are only there to give birth to children. Lie. - Muhajirah       
Tweet  
 
Muhijirat “success stories” act as a recruitment tactic by showing other individuals that 
migration is possible, and they promote the IS as a legitimate state where women happily live 
and raise their children.  
Widows. A Widow is a woman who has migrated to IS-held territory and married an 
IS fighter who has since deceased. Although the researchers only identified nine Widows in 
the sample, it is not uncommon for women in IS-held territory to lose their husbands. In fact, 
male martyrdom is viewed as honorable and is praised by IS members: 
Ya Ibn ash Shaheed, be proud of your Father. He sacrificed his life for the   
One who created you. May Allaah unite us all in Jannah. - Widow Tweet  
 
A male jihadi seeks to gain sharaf (male honour) through martyrdom; however, it is said that 
a woman cannot obtain sharaf and therefore her honour is gained through her association with 
male martyrs (also referred to as Shaheed’s), primarily her husband and son(s) (Ness, 2005; 
Von Knop, 2007): 
"I already have a beautiful dress to wear the day when my Son will go        
SHAHEED. I would be the proudest&amp; happiest." The mother of a       
Mujahid. - Widow Tweet  
 
The Widows typically post a Tweet declaring that it has been confirmed their husband has got 
shahada (that they have been martyred): 
May Allah accept my husband Abu Antar, it's been confirmed he got shahada     
please make dua for him that Allah accept him. - Widow Tweet  
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 After a woman becomes a Widow, the content of her Tweets often expresses how 
proud she is and how blessed she feels to be the wife of a Shaheed. Their posts typically include 
a lot of religious content –  they will ask for duas that their husbands will be accepted by Allah, 
and that they will be reunited with them in the afterlife. These Widows have a very high status 
within the IS online and real-time communities because of their husband’s sacrifice for the IS 
cause: 
The shaheed has fought for Islam and Muslims. He gave up his life for me              
and you. Therefore the families of the shaheeds need to be honored…                          
- Widow Tweet  
 
 Widows are considered to be very radicalized and extremely ideologically committed 
to IS ideology. This dedication is demonstrated through their commitment to not only migrate 
to the IS, but marry an IS fighter and celebrate their martyrdom.  
Terrorists. Over the course of this one-year study, two individuals engaged in pro-
terrorist activities and have been charged with terrorism-related offences. The first is a fifteen-
year-old British female who may be facing up to twelve years for attempting to make hijrah. 
Migration to the IS is against the law in many countries including Britain, the United States, 
and Canada. For example, in Canada the Criminal Code prohibits any person from “leaving or 
attempting to leave Canada, or boarding or attempting to board a conveyance with the intent 
to leave Canada” to participate in, or contribute to a terrorist group (Bird & Valiquet, 2012 p. 
7; Criminal Code, 2016). Though the Muhijirat who successfully migrated to IS-held territory 
(from a country where it is illegal) are technically guilty of a terrorism-related offence, only 
individuals who were charged with attempting to make hijrah are included in this role. The 
British teenager denied that she was travelling to IS-held territory to participate in the terrorist 
group and instead claimed that she was going on a “holiday”: 
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I was just going on holiday fam. I have to sit in court for an hour and listen     
to people lie about me. http://t.co/TvReDvdDIT - Terrorist Tweet 
 
The British female posted various Tweets about her arrest stating that she was due in court in 
August, and that the judge decided her passport should be held to prevent her from attempting 
to flee. She also Tweeted that she has “never supported be headings [sic] or terrorism”, and 
that the “stupid counter terrorism officers” were accusing her of things she did not do. 
The second individual is a sixteen-year-old British female who was charged with two 
terror offenses related to documents in her possession which contained “information of a kind 
likely to be of use to a person preparing or committing an act of terrorism” (McKeegan & 
Mercer, 2015). The girl posted various Tweets denying that she had any affiliation with the IS, 
for example, she wrote: “WHEN DID I EVER SUPPORT IS???”. The British teenager 
Tweeted that she was suspected of being a “conspiracy theorist” and a “hacker for IS”, but that 
she was released on bail. Although she denies any affiliation with the IS in her earlier Tweets, 
the last Tweet she posted said: 
I was once a conspiracy theorist who was then radicalized....but now im just        
a conspiracy theorist. Seriously. - Terrorist Tweet  
 
After the conclusion of the study period, a third woman was charged with terrorism 
related offences – she is the noteworthy “ISIS Superstar” who was mentioned in this paper’s 
introduction. She was arrested for conspiracy and issuing a threat towards FBI agents via 
Twitter. Her friends and family were interviewed claiming that she was not a terrorist, that she 
had never left the country, and that she was merely a reclusive mother who retweeted what 
others had posted (Zavadski, 2016). In 2015, she posted this Tweet: “Get this, I don't know 
anyone in Syria or Iraq. Not a soul. I report the news and voice a few unsavory opinions.” 
Except the “ISIS Superstar” did produce a large amount of original content, and she had a huge 
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following on both Twitter and Facebook. Her case has raised issues regarding freedom of 
speech and what online activity can be considered criminal (Hong, 2016; Spencer, 2017).  
Leavers. A Leaver is a woman who was previously a member of the IS Twitter social 
network but then left. Only those women who publically posted about their departure on 
Twitter were coded as a Leaver. The researchers identified four Leavers in the sample, however 
it is likely more than four women left the IS social network because Twitter accounts frequently 
disappeared.  
Leaver’s have varying levels of radicalization depending on their reason for 
abandoning their IS commitment. Some women may choose to leave the IS for another pro-
Jihadist group and therefore they are still radicalized to an extent. For example, this woman 
left her IS social network to join an Al Qaida one: 
 ❤ Al Qaida ❤ - Leaver Tweet  
In other cases, it appears that some women have chosen to abandon pro-jihadist affiliated 
networks altogether: 
may Allah destroy IS,  Amîn... - Leaver Tweet  
 
This is the adab of the so-called islamic state! And they wonder why       
Muslims don't support them! https://t.co/e7yrUnEr1V  - Leaver Tweet  
 
The author of the above Tweet stopped supporting the IS, but remained committed to radical 
jihadist thought. This Leaver was in contact with Elton “Ibrahim” Simpson, one of the men 
who attacked a “Draw Muhammad” event in Garland, Texas in 201519 (Amarasingam, 2015). 
Simpson dedicated his attack to the IS, and was shot by authorities at the scene. It is possible 
that this Leaver abandoned her pro-IS ideology because she believed Simpson was set up. She 
                                                
19 See Amarasingam’s article “Elton “Ibrahim” Simpson’s Path to Jihad in Garland Texas” for more information.  
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Tweeted that her “…problem is with the instigator of the #garlandshooting sending our bros 
to a death trap!...”, and that they had “no training what’s [sic] so ever” to “[face] over 50 police 
officers”.  
            Other account holders did not provide a specific reason for their departure. As an 
example, this woman simply posted that she would no longer be active on Twitter: 
I know the acc is still active during 30 days but I won't be here. So if you              
have any messages I can answer now in sha Allah. - Leaver Tweet  
 
Understanding the reasons why women are choosing to leave IS social networks can 
help develop ways to deter the path to extremism and encourage individuals to abandon their 
pro-IS ideology.   
Discussion  
 The research questions for this paper were (1) will identifiable patterns of engagement 
be revealed through a thematic analysis of Tweets posted by pro-IS women?, and (2) do these 
patterns illuminate the roles pro-IS women occupy online and in real-time social networks? 
The answer to both of these questions is yes. Eight identifiable patterns of engagement were 
revealed through the thematic analysis of the women’s Tweets, and these patterns have helped 
to explain what roles these women play within pro-IS online and real-time social networks.  
In the past, women’s roles within pro-jihadist networks have been largely overlooked. 
Much of the literature has suggested that women fulfill primarily supportive roles as wives and 
mothers (Conway & McInerney, 2012; Hoard & Makin, 2014); however, more recent research 
has suggested that social media can empower women and influence more gender equality 
within pro-jihadist groups (Peresin, 2015). The various roles women play online demonstrates 
that the assumption women only fulfill supportive roles in pro-jihadist networks is partially a 
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misconception. Although this study has revealed that women are sometimes involved in more 
active, typically “male-oriented” roles such as recruiters and terrorists, it was nevertheless 
found that women principally fulfill supportive roles. Women are primarily using their Twitter 
accounts to provide ideological and emotional support to pro-IS members (Huey & Peladeau, 
2016). They are also Tweeting propaganda, educating others about the appropriate dogma of 
the IS, and celebrating male violence and martyrdom. Although women operate many roles 
online, this study has revealed that women within the IS Twitter social network continue to be 
largely absent from more direct action and support.  
 While women who fulfill supportive roles may not promote gender equality within their 
pro-jihadist group, these supportive roles are not dismissed as unimportant within the IS 
community. Propagandists, Recruiters, and even Fan-Girls are vitally important for 
maintaining existing IS social networks by posting and sharing Tweets that help promote the 
IS ideology and encourage hijrah; and the admiration the Muhijirat, Widows, and Baqiya 
members receive for their contributions to the IS community illustrates that women’s non-
military support is both praised and relied on for the success of jihad (Lahoud, 2014). 
 Pro-jihadist networks are among the most challenging groups to study because of their 
status as a hard-to-reach population and their distrust towards researchers. Nevertheless, pro-
jihadist groups like the IS are highly present on social media networking sites like Twitter, and 
thus social media research remains one of the best ways to study this difficult to reach 
population. The “2016 Public Safety Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada” calls advances 
in technology and women’s participation in terrorism-related activities two of the leading 
“emerging issues” changing the “counter-terrorism landscape” today (p. 16). Although male 
foreign fighters continue to make up the majority of IS migrants and remain the focus of 
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terrorism related research, this study has demonstrated that women are also at a very high risk 
of being radicalized and making hijrah. However, as the “2016 Public Safety Report” states 
“it is often unclear which roles women who travel to Syria perform” (p. 16).  
The present study contributes to much needed knowledge on women’s roles in the IS-
held territory and online affiliated communities, and its findings can be utilized to help 
understand what attracts women to the IS. For example, reviewing Fan-Girl Tweets and 
understanding the “jihadi cool” factor (Huey, 2015) can help anti-radicalization experts 
recognize why youth perceive belonging to a pro-jihadist group as “trendy” and “cool”. 
Furthermore, analyzing Muhajirah Tweets can help us understand why women chose to make 
hijrah, while Recruiter and Propagandist Tweets can teach us how individuals are being 
radicalized and recruited to the IS through Twitter. This knowledge can also be used to develop 
more effective counterterrorism strategies to deter the radicalization and recruitment of 
individuals online. One potential strategy could be targeting Fan-Girls for de-radicalization 
programs before they are accepted into the online Baqiya “family” where their emotional and 
ideological bonds to the IS may be strengthened therefore making the de-radicalization process 
more challenging.  
To further deter online radicalization and recruitment, Twitter and other social media 
networking sites need to be vigilant in suspending accounts that show pro-IS affiliations and 
block users from creating new accounts. Berger and Morgan (2015) note that account 
suspensions do limit the IS’s influence on social media; however, they argue suspensions are 
also ineffective because IS propaganda is still available on Twitter and that widespread account 
suspensions can actually pose a risk: 
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[W]hile suspensions appear to have created obstacles to supporters joining ISIS’s social 
network, they also isolate ISIS supporters online. This could increase the speed and 
intensity of radicalization for those who do manage to enter the network, and hinder 
organic social pressures that could lead to deradicalization. (p. 3).  
 
Berger and Morgan (2015) also discuss pro-IS Twitter user’s ability to control particular 
hashtags to disseminate their propaganda “outside of its own social network to harass and 
intimidate outsiders, as well as to attract potential recruits” (p. 12). Hashtags like #IS, #jihad, 
and #khilafah20 were popular among the women in our sample, and their widespread use by IS 
supporters sometimes results in these hashtags “trending”21 on Twitter and being seen by users 
outside of the IS social network (Berger & Morgan, 2015). Future anti-radicalization efforts 
should examine the use of hashtags to disseminate propaganda, and investigate Twitter’s 
capacity to block the use of specific IS-related hashtags.  
Conclusions 
 No research is without limitations, and research using social media is particularly 
challenging. When including profiles to follow for this study, the researchers were limited to 
primarily English-posting account holders. Future research that incorporates Tweets in 
multiple languages (specifically Arabic) will help draw more detailed conclusions. This 
research is also limited by the possibility of “sock puppet” accounts. Sock puppet accounts are 
accounts that are created to manipulate or deceive a particular audience. They are operated by 
people who are pretending to be someone they are not – in this case a person with a pro-IS 
affiliation. Since there is no way to authenticate the identities of the individuals operating 
Twitter accounts, social media research runs the risk of collecting fabricated information 
                                                
20 Referring to the IS Caliphate.  
21 A “trending” hashtag is a hashtag that has been frequently used and is popular on Twitter at a particular point 
in time.  
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created by sock puppet accounts, and drawing false conclusions22 (Huey & Kalyal, 2015). Non-
random snowball sampling was used to collect the data for this study, which means the sample 
is not representative of the entire population, and thus the findings of this research study cannot 
be generalized. Future research that investigate women’s roles in pro-jihadist social networks 
will continue to help focus anti-radicalization efforts and expand our knowledge on how social 
media, gender, and pro-jihadist identity interrelate.  
The assumed subordinate status of women in pro-jihadist groups has led to the 
misconception that they have little to no role within extremist groups (Bloom, 2011; Huey & 
Kalyal, 2015), but this study has demonstrated that women play various roles in the IS online 
social network. Women are becoming increasingly important contributors to pro-jihadist 
networks, and although they may not appear on the front lines, their support online is 
strengthening the IS ideology. If researchers and counterterrorism specialists disregard 
women’s influence in these groups it will result in ineffective counterterrorism strategies, and 
an incomplete understanding of the threat the IS poses. By paying attention to the messages 
being disseminated through Twitter, and those individuals targeted by pro-IS propaganda and 
recruitment techniques, it is possible that radicalization and potential migrants can be deterred. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
22 See Huey and Kalyal’s (2015) study for more information about how sock puppet accounts interfere with 
online terrorism research.  
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